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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

RELL{\NCE NATIONAL LIFE
\
IXSl~ltANCE COMPANY,
)
Plaintiff and ..~1 ppellant,
l Case No.
vs.

10,003

\Y"ILLIAM P. HANSEN,
Defendant and Respondent.

PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is an action by the plaintiff, Reliance National
Life Insurance Company, for the recision of a written
contract of employment, between plaintiff and defendant, ''rilliam P. Hansen. The plaintiff claims that
certain fraudulent statements made by defendant during the preliminary negotiations induced plaintiff to
3
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enter into the employment contract, and that at the
time tli~ .tst~t~mepts_ ;were made by defendant, he knew
them to be false and misleading. Plaintiff further
claims that after the contract· had been signed by both
parties, the defen<;lant conducted himself in such a
manner that there were reasonable grounds to terminate
the contract for cause.
As a result of the foregoing, plaintiff contends all
monies paid to the defendant under the contract and
all expenses inc~tred by virtue of ·hi~· employment should
. . .
..
'
.
be returned, an.d that defendant have no rights by reason
thereof.
,·
:

-

~

-

~

-Defendant counterclaimed ·and alleged that there
are certain monies due him by virtue of the con~ra~t of
employment, as well as commissions- e~rned after the
contract had been terminated.
:<

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
-.

The case was tried to the court. From a judgment
for defendant of "no cause of action on plaintiff's complaint," and an award of $3,500.00 on two separate
counts of the defendant's counterclaim, plaintiff appeal~.. The first :Pal-t o( the coluitercl~im' inVolves the
. severing of that portion of the contract dealing with
the-airplane·from the- contract as a whole; the second,
commissions ·earned; after- the contract was terminated.
·The judgment further -provides thaf the- defendant's
contract of- employment was "terminated -for cause"
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und ,therefore, defendant \vas not entitled to receive any

n1onies that accrued in the for1n of bonuses or override
l'onunissions. 'fhe plaintiff appeals upon the grounds
th:tt the judgtneut of the court is not supported hy the
Findings of Fact.

l{ELIEF SOUGIIT ON APPEAL
Plaintifl' seeks reversal from that portion of the
L<l\rer C'ourt's judgment \vhich finds that the defendant
rnay recover the unpaid balance ($2,500.00) due on the
airplane. The plaintiff also seeks reversal from that
portion of the Lower Court's judgment which finds
that the defendant is entitled to recover certain comInissions claimed to have been earned after the employment contract 'vas terminated. The plaintiff further
seeks recovery of all monies paid under the contract,
as \veil as the expenses incurred in the maintenance of
the airplane referred to above, along with all payments
1nade "·bile the airplane was in the possession of the
plaintiff, plaintiff having assumed the original purchase
contract.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff is a corporation organized on J anuary :?6, 195~, for the purpose of selling life insurance.
Frank B. Salisbury helped organize the company, and
since its incorporation has actively managed the company as its president. (R. 59, 60). In June of 1961,
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1)1

•,

Salisbury saw an advertisement in a bulletin called
"The Western Underwriter" outlining the qualifications of the defendant, Mr. Hansen. (R. 61). After the
original contact between Salisbury and Mr. Hansen,
negotiations were entered into, and preliminary to the
signing of the employment contract, (P. Exh. 1), Mr.
Hansen made the following representations which were
f~lse, and known. to be ~alse, at the time made:
(a) Defendant had a presently exis'ting sales
organization which defendant would bring
with him to Plaintiff company. (R. 63).
(b) Defendant had developed a way of selling
mutual funds and insurance policies in a
package and that this program had been
approved by the insurance commissioner of
Utah and the S.E.C. (R. 63, 64, 65).
(c) Defendant had developed sales material to
be used by insurance ·salesmen in selling a
package consisting of mutual funds and insurance policies, and this sales material had
been approved by the insurance commissioner. (R. 75, 104) (P. Exh. 23).
(d) Defendant had successfully field tested this
program~ ( R. 64) .
Also, during p~reliminary talks the defendant represented that an airplane he owned was necessary for
the success of the sales program. ( R. 233) . As a result,
plain~iff agreed 'to accept an assignment .of defendant's
equity in the airplane for a total consideration of
$4,000.00. One Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($1,500.00) of this a1nount was paid defendant on the day

6
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the en1ployn1ent contract was signed, the balance was
due on or before J nnuary 20, 1962. This was made a
part of the contract of employment. ( P. Exh. 1).

!Juring the first part of September, plaintiff acted
to ter1nina te the contract. ( R. 80) . After notice of tertnination the defendant was offered the airplane if he
\rould repay the initial $1,500.00, which he refused.
(It :!:J:!). The refusal was due to his financial condition at the time. (R. 242).
During the period plaintiff had possession of the
airplane\ it paid out a total of $8,559.08. (R. 133). This
figure includes monthly payments, insurance, maintenance\ fuel, etc. ( R. 133). The airplane was sold April
1~\

1962.

Prior to the termination of the employment contract, plaintiff paid to defendant $3,7 50.00 in salary;
ho,vever, there were no bonuses paid. (R. 186) .
.l\.fter termination the defendant continued with
the company for a short period on a commission basis.
During this period defendant claims to have earned
~1,000.00 in commissions. (R. 245}. The plaintiff contends if anything is due, it does not exceed $45.00. (R.
30, 31, 32, P. Ex ..... ).
Plaintiff presented evidence which shows it was
dan1uged in the sum of $20,107.30 because of defendant's false statements. (R. 133}. The breakdown is as
folJo,vs:

7
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Airplane
Commissions, etc.
New Sales Program, etc._
Salary paid defendant

$8,559.08
4,497.22
3,301.00
3,750.00

(R.
( R.
(R.
(R.

133)
133)
133)
186)

POINT I
THE COURT'S CONCLUSION OF LAW
WHEREIN IT FOUND "NO· CAUSE OF ACTION" ON PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT, AND
YET FOUND AS A FACT THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS GUILTY OF FALSE AND
FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATIONS IN
THE NEGOTIATIONS PRELIMINARY TO
THE SIGNING OF THE EMPLOYMEN'l'
CONTRACT ARE ERRONEOUS.
The Findings of Fact as accepted by the court are
not disputed by the defendant in that no cross appeal
was filed. ·The~ pertinent provisions are :
.

"1. _Plaintiff is a corp,oration .organi~ed and existing

pur~uant. to the laws of the State of Utah, and is duly

authorized to engage in the insurance business in the
State of Utah.
2. Frank B. Salisbury is the President of Plaintiff

corporation.
3. Defendant is an experienced insurance salesman

and has served in administrative capacities with various
insurance companies in the State of Utah.

8
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4. 'l'he defendant inserted a notice in an insurance

journal to the effect that he \vas seeking employment
with an insurance cotnpauy. Pursuant to this notice,
deft.:ndant \vas personally interviewed by Frank B.
Salisbury concerning the possibility of defendant being
trnployed by plaintiff. Salisbury made no search of
det'endan t ·s past record.
5. The defendant made the following representa-

tions uf fact to Frank B. Salisbury for the purpose of
indnciny plaintiff to e1~ter into an employment contract
1cith the defendant:

a. Defendant had a presently existing sales organization which defendant would bring with
him to Plaintiff company.
b. Defendant had developed a way of selling
mutual funds and insurance policies in a package and that this program had been approved
by the insurance commissioner.
c. Defendant had developed sales material to be
used by insurance salesmen in selling a package consisting of mutual funds and insurance
policies, and this sales material had been approved by the insurance commissioner.
d. Defendant had successfully field tested this
program.
6. The statements made by defendant to plaintiff'_,
as set forth under Finding of Fact }.ro. 5, were false and
u:ere kno~·n by defendant to be false at the time they
'ii.'ere made.
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7. Plaintiff would 1~ot have entered into any contract with defendant had it not been for the false statements by defendant to plaintiff~ as set forth in Finding
of Fact No. 5.
8. In reliance on the state11tents made by defendant

to plaintiff~ as set forth in Finding of Fact No.5~ plaintiff entered into a writte'n contract with defendant which
was received in eviden~ce as Pretrial Exhibit I, pursuant
to which plaintiff agreed as follows:

a. To assume the purchase contract of a certain
airplane being purchased by defendant and to
pay defendant the sum of $4,000.00 for defenda~t~s equity in the same.
b. To pay defendant a bopus in an amount equal
to 1% of all first year premiums on life insurance business collected by plaintiff during the
defendant's employment with plaintiff.
c. To pay defendant a salary of $1,500.00 per
month.
d. To pay defendant a bonus based on the difference between the cost of acquiring new business and 100% of the amount of premium received of new business.
9. The contract of employment between plaintiff

and defendant~ as set forth in Finding of Fact No. 8,
was terminated by plaintiff for ca1tse due to the following acts of the defendant:

a. The defendant was directed to sell the aforesaid airplane and made no effort to do so.
b. The defendant was instructed not to approach
the insurance department of the State of Idaho

10
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in regard to the Estate Accumulator Policy.
~ evertheless, the defendant did consult with
that department 'vith negative results to the
prejudice of plaintiff.
c. Defendant was instructed not to sell a participating policy which was being designed by
plaintiff until the policy had been approved by
plaintiff's actuary. Nevertheless, defendant
proceeded to sell this policy before approval
from the actuary was obtained.
d. Defendant was instructed not to contact any
insurance department regarding approval of
the Estate Accumulator policy, but to leave
this matter in the hands of the actuary for
plaintiff. Nevertheless, defendant wrote the
Insurance Commissioner of the State of Washington regarding approval of this policy with
adverse results to plaintiff.
e. Defendant was instructed not to use the com·
pany airplane for personal business, but never·
theless did use the airplane for personal business.
10. The agreement of plaintiff to purchMe the

rquity of defendant in the aforesaid airplane WM a separate agreement divisible from the employment contract
and the terms thereof.
II. Plaintiff did not learn of the falsity of defendant's statements, as set forth in Finding of Fact No. 5,

until n1ore than three months after plaintiff and defendant entered into the aforesaid employment contract.
I2. Plaintiff hM paid the sum of $8,268.40 on the

purchase contract of the said airplane and for the up-
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1-ceep thereof., but plaintiff has not paid defendant the
sum of $2,500.00 which plaintiff agreed to pay defendant under the terms of the aforesaid employment contract.
13. At the time plaintiff terminated the said em-

ployment contract~ plaintiff requested defendant to
take possession of the said airpla1~e and assume the burden of completing the purchase contract payments.
14. Plaintiff paid the defendant the sum of $3,750.00 as salary under the terms of said employment

contract.
15. Subsequent to the time plaintiff terminated the

said employment contract, defendant sold certain insurance policies for plaintiff, and there is now due the
defendant, as commissions on such sales, the sum of
$1,000.00.

The Court having entered its Findings of Fact,
now makes the following conclusions of law:
1. Defendant is not entitled to any compensation

by reason of the employment contract entered
into between plaintiff and defendant.
2. The agreement of plaintiff to purchase the
equity of defendant in the aforesaid airplane
was a separate agreement, divisible from the
employment contract, the defendant is entitled to judgment against plaintiff in the sum
of $2,500.00, being the amount plaintiff agreed
to pay defendant for defendant's said equity.
3. Defendant is entitled to judgment against the
plaintiff in the amount of $1,000.00 being the
amount owed by plaintiff to defendant for in-
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surance com1nissions earned by defendant subsequent to the termination of the aforesaid
employn1ent contract''. (Emphasis added).
1\ ton tract induced by fraud is voidable at the
option of the party injured by the fraud, and the defrauded party may elect to rescind the contract upon
its discovery; however, he must act with reasonable
prornptness, 12 A1n. Jnr. 638, 639; 2~ Am Jur. 12; Taylor 'l's. 1lloorc, ct al., 51 P.2d 222, 87 Utah 493; Shappirio t's. Goldberg, 192 U.S. 232; 24 S.Ct. 259; Levine
t'f al. 'lW. Whitehoza~e ct al.~ 109 P.2, 37 Utah 260.
''rhere a party sues for the recision of a "\vritten
contract, the purpose of the proceedings is to restore
the defrauded party to the position he was in prior to
the execution of the instrument induced by the fraud
of the other contracting party. Where there has been
a serious and intentional atten1pt to deceive, the party
upon 'vhom the fraud has been imposed must, upon its
discovery, act. In the case of S kola vs. Merrill~ et al. ~
64 P.2d 185, 91 Utah 253, this court impressed this requirement upon the law of this state.
In the case presently before this Honorable Court,
:\Ir. Salisbury, acting as president of the plaintiff, notified the defendant of the termination of the agreement,
and tendered back the airplane within a matter of days
after it "·as discovered that the representations made
by the defendant were false.
The restoration of the status quo in a proper case
of recision is a two-edged sword. The courts have held
that it is necessary that both parties be returned to the
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position that existed prior to the contract. The party
rescinding must tender back that which he received.
Thus, when the person defrauded has been induced
into making expenditures as a result of misrepresentation, provided they were reasonable, these are recoverable, insofar as they have been rendered fruitless because
of the deceit. McCormick on Damages~ Ch. 18, § 122,
p. 458.
In recision the plaintiff's expenditures are naturally
recoverable, with due accounting for benefits. Johnson
vs. Gilbert~ 382 P.2d 87. ---·---- Ore..... ; Strand Bldg.
Corp vs. Russell & Saxe~ Inc.~ 232 N.Y. 2d 384; First
National Bank of West Plains vs. King~ 363 S.W. 2d
590, ____ ; Erisman vs. Overman~ 358 P.2d 85, II P.2d
258.

The Erisman case, above cited, supports the general principles of law in matters of recision. The party
rescinding must tender back everything received before
the court restores the status quo between the parties.
The corollary of this rule is also accepted, that where
there is fraud involved, and a timely tender made, the
defrauded party has the right to receive back what has
been paid or given or assumed under a contract.

POINT II
THE COURT REACHED ERRONEOUS
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW FROM THE FACTS
FOUND WHEREIN IT AWARDED JUDGMENT FOR THE DEFENDANT BASED UP-

14
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()X 'rilE

S~~\~Elt.(\IJILI'I'Y

OF 'fHAT POR1,1(>~ ()~, TII.E C'.ON'rlt1\CT DEALING \\riTI-1
'filE "\lllPLANE.
In considering the question of fraud and misrepresl'ntalion the party seeking relief must allege and
proYe what representations were made, that they were
fnlse and known to be so by the party charged, and
that the party seeking relief believed the rep res entation
to be true and that he acted upon them and was injured
thereby.
In light of the foregoing, it must be said, based
upon the findings of the court, that this was accomplished,and, therefore, the judgment finding severable
that portion of the contract dealing with the airplane
is erroneous. All of the evidence points to the fact that
the airplane was represented to be essential to success
of the total program that defendant outlined to Salisbury. The record is as fallows :
)lr. Barker
"Q. Do you recall any other statements which
he made to you?
)lr. Salisbury
"A. He stated that in order put forth this program, to put forth this program, to put it into
effect and contact these salesmen throughout the
state, that he had to have the Mooney airplane
that he had at the time, and in order to put this
program into effect it would be necessary for our
company to assume the obligation that he had
on this Mooney airplane so that he could fly it
throughout the various places in the state and con-
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tact these men that he had that would come with
us.
"Q. Did he make any statements as to the use
he had previously made of this airplane?
"A. He said that it had proven very valuable
to him, and anytime I wasn't convinced that it
was a profitable venture to have an airplane,
that he could get rid of it at any time without
loss to us. That is to the company.

•

*

*

*

Mr. Barker
"Q. I will get into specifics. As far as this
airplane is concerned, did he not resist the inclusion of this airplane in the contract, in this contract all the way?
Mr. Hansen
"A. He did resist the inclusion of the airplane.
"Q. In the representations that were made on
the airplane, did you not tell him that you had
used this airplane extensively in the program
that you had field tested?
"A. I told him that we had used it to our advantage.
"Q. And that if the present program that you
were presenting to him for his acceptance was
to be successful that you had to have that air-

plane?
''A. There wasn't any hinge on the success of
the program at all. The idea was that the airplane
would facilitate matters, moving through the 11state area that Reliance was in at that time much
more rapidly and an easier problem than if I
were to go to commercial airlines, and that was
the only commitment, for that statement.

16
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"Q. 1\nd did you not tell hitn that in your
experience \vith airplanes and this particular
type of airplane, that the airplane could readily
be disposed of "·ithout loss?

".t\. I never said anything like 'without loss,'
be<'ause naturally there is natural depreciation.

uQ. \ \rithout loss other than depreciation?
~'..t\.

1"'his would be the normal. 'We can al,vays
sell it,' were my terms as I recall it, and that
was all."
'fhe airplane was therefore made an integral part
of the tnisrepresented facts, and it is evident that the
plaintiff would not have assumed the defendant's equity
in the airplane but for his grossly false statements.
\ \rhere a contract involves several parts, yet make
up one transaction, fraud in one part vitiates the entire
agreement. !'leredith vs. Ramsdell~ 384 P.2d 941, ___ _
Colo. 2d ....•
To the same effect is the case of .Anson vs. Grace~
117 X.l\r. 2d 117 N.W.2d 529, 174 Neb. 2d 258.
'fherefore, the court erred in granting the defendant the sum of $2,500.00 as the unpaid portion of the
price of defendant's equity in the airplane.

POINT III
A JUDGl\IENT ~lAY NOT BE BASED
lTPOX ~IERE CONJECTURE, Sl_~R)IISE OR
SPECUL . .~TION, AND THE COURT THUS

17
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ERRED WHEREIN IT AWARDED A JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT FOR THE COMMISSIONS CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN
EARNED AFTER THE TERMINATION OF
THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT.
The burden of proof requires the party carrying
it to prove to the court the fact upon which his case
depends, by a preponderance of greater weight of the
credible evidence. To create a preponderance of evidence, the evidence must be sufficient to overcome the
opposing proposition as well as the opposing evidence.
The trier of a case, when doubts arise concerning the
weight of the evidence, must find for the side whereon
the doubts have less weight.
The only evidence offered by the defendant concerning the claimed commissions was his statement found
on page 245 of the record, which is as follows:

"Q. By Mr. Tuft) As to commissions, Mr.
Hansen, did you keep track of the commissions
due you?
"A. I had no way because the company was
keeping up most of those, but I do have track of
the contracts and can calculate them, and that
should be, in round figures, approximately
$1,000.00.

"Q. To the best of your belief, $1,000.00?

"A. Yes."
His excuse for not having more was, that all of the
records concerning the sales and payments made there-

18
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

under 'verc in the possession and control of the plain-

titl'. 'fhe plaintiff introduced all of its records. (See
Ex h..... ) . 'fhere is contained in the record a sutnmary
of' these records and it is found on pages 31 and 32.
1\eeording to the corporation records, which are by far
the Lest c\·idence, there is due to Mr. Hansen the amount
of· $43.ti~.
A verdict may not lawfully be predicated upon
n1cre conjecture or speculation, and in this case that is
the only \ray the court could arrive at its conclusion.
The defendant, having the burden of proof insofar
us the claimed commissions are concerned, was obligated to establish the fact alleged by evidence at least
sufficient to destroy the validity of the corporate records. Can it be said that an estimate is sufficient to do
this~ The defendant did not, at any time, question the
completeness of the corporate records, nor did he produce any records of his own to show that the records
\vere not accurate.
Therefore, it would appear that there is no real
evidence in the record upon which the court could justly
find in favor of the defendant. From the evidence
adduced at the trial the court erred in granting a judgnlent for the defendant for the sum of $1,000.00, when
in fact, there was only $43.62 due.
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CONCLUSION
This court should set aside the determination of the
Lower Court that the plaintiff's complaint be dismissed
"no cause of action" and award to the plaintiff the
damages proved by a preponderance of the evidence,
in the amount of $20,107.30, because of the proven fact
of fraud in the inducement of the employment contract.
The court should also find that since the award to the
defendant of $2,500.00 was based upon the severability
of that portion of the contract dealing with the airplane,
from the contract as a whole, was wrong. The court
should further find that if there is any amount due and
owing to the defendant, that that sum does not exceed
$43.62 and that amount may be offset against the
$20,107.30, which the plaintiff has proven.
Respectfully submitted,
BARKER & RYBERG
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Appellant
68 East 21st South
Salt Lake City, Utah
TUFT & McRAE
Attorneys for Defendant
and Respondent
53 East 4th South
Salt Lake City, Utah
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